Kinshasa's Bad Behavior Should not be Emboldened

 As norm demands, agreements must be kept in good faith. By failing to fulfill their obligations as agreed upon in peace talks, authorities in Kinshasa act in bad faith. And every moment they fail to act in good faith, strides made towards achieving lasting peace in both the DRC and the region are derailed.  

EACRF and M23 negotiate


Since the resurgence of the M23 last year, the East African Community has taken initiative and committed immense efforts towards ending the security crisis in the East of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Summits have been held at both the East African Community and South African Development Cooperation levels to end the predicament. 

At each of the summits held, conclusions were reached with recommendations made for each side of the warring parties to fulfill specific obligations to allow for a political resolution of the conflict.  

The government of the DRC has failed to fulfill most of its own share of the requirements while its rival- the M23- has, against its immediate interests, fulfilled what was required of it. The M23 withdrew from most of the positions it had captured from the coalition of DRC armed forces (FADRC), FDLR, CODECO, Mai Mai and other partner groups. The withdrawal of the M23 was inspected and aided by the EAC Regional Force whose mandate was to create a buffer zone between warring parties in order to make room for negotiations- a mandate authorities in Kinshasa have, oftentimes, intentionally miscommunicated to the Congolese populace in a bid to extend the blame for the crisis to Rwanda and abdicate responsibility. 

As norm demands, agreements must be kept in good faith. By failing to fulfill their obligations as agreed upon in peace talks, authorities in Kinshasa act in bad faith. And every moment they fail to act in good faith, strides made towards achieving lasting peace in both the DRC and the region are derailed.  

 

History of Kinshasa not keeping agreements in good faith 


In the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which sought to end the second Congo War that had started in 1998, DRC was required to, among others, track down and disarm armed groups, hand over genocidaires to the International Tribunal for Rwanda, cease its cooperation with and support to the ex-FAR and Interahamwe (both anti-Tutsi and anti-Rwanda genocidal armed groups) from which came the current  Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). DRC was also required to hold a national dialogue which was to include the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), a predecessor organization to the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP)-from which the M23 sprang. DRC did not adhere to the provisions of the Ceasefire Agreement, at least not to their entirety. Instead, since then, with the help of Kinshasa, the ex-FAR and Interahamwe have evolved to become FDLR. And with the help of elements in the Kinshasa government the FDLR has carried out numerous attacks on Rwandan territory killing people and destroying property while officials in Kinshasa continue their efforts to sanitize the group. Even worse, following the M23's resurgence last year (after Kinshasa's refusal to hold talks with the group), the FARDC has openly been collaborating with the FDLR and they, together, shelled Rwandan territory multiple times in the period leading to the Commonwealth Heads-of-Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Kigali last year. 

 

The Matrix 


DRC officials together with their sympathizers demand that Rwanda withdraw its troops (if any at all) from Congolese territory and cease its support to the M23. While these demands are made, parallel demands are also made for the government of the DRC to cease its cooperation with the FDLR, other armed groups and put an end to anti-Tutsi hate speech in DRC.  

But knowing pretty well that Kinshasa has failed to heed calls to cease its support to the FDLR since such calls were first made in the 1990s, and knowing that one of the M23's core demands to the DRC government is the protection of Congolese Tutsi communities against killings by the FDLR and allied armed groups, how do actors like the United Nations and the United States of America fail or willingly refuse to acknowledge that the denominator in this predicament is the FDLR and that to solve the problem once and for all, the FDLR should be made the focus and not any other entity? 

Rwanda's concern is continued FARDC and government of the DRC's support for and rearmament of the FDLR which poses grave threats to Rwanda's security. The M23's core concern is the endless killings of Congolese Tutsi by the FDLR and satellite groups (all armed by Congolese officials, in part or entirely). Kinshasa's concern is the M23, yet the M23 exists largely because of the existence of the FDLR. The common factor in this is the FDLR. 

 

Best Way Forward 


If the Tutsi continue to be persecuted, it is hard to believe that those who share the desire and commitment to protect them will not collaborate, in any way, to that effect. If the United Nations and the United States of America have sufficient evidence of Rwanda's material support (for moral support is a given) to the M23 and, considering the UN's and USA's acknowledgement of the cause for which the M23 is fighting, it is appropriate that they seek to solve the problem from its foundations rather than give directives and dictates which will not yield the total security and peace desired by victim communities and the region. 

The United Nations and United States of America, as well as other entities whose calls and dictates Kinshasa can heed, should strive to get Kinshasa to adhere to both Luanda and Nairobi arrangements for solving security problems in the Kivu's. Kinshasa should be made to commit to ceasing all moral and material support to the FDLR and collaborate with regional actors to eradicate the genocidal group. Kinshasa should also be made to commit to eradicating the other more than 200 armed groups, local and foreign, operating on its territory. Kinshasa should be made to commit to resolving nationality issues for its Kinyarwanda-speaking communities and accord them equal political rights just as other Congolese citizens. Kinshasa should be made to commit to repatriation and resettlement of its citizens scattered in refugee camps all over the Central and East African region. 

Getting Kinshasa to play its higher role in resolving its internal problems, and not aiding it in its perpetual blame games, will end the security crisis in DRC and the Great Lakes region.  



By: Steven Caleb Katurebe

  

  

  

 

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